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A Few Methodological Remarks 
on Optimization Random Cost Functions 
Yuri A. Rozanov 
Let f(a,x) be a functional of a variable XEX, where a 
is some "unobservable" random parameter with a probability 
distribution P. Suppose we have to choose some point XOEX, 
and we like to optimize this procedure in some sense of 
minimization of f(a,x), XEX, with unknown parameter a. 
For example, f (a,x) may be a cost function of some eco- 
nomic model concerning future time, say 
where X is a given convex set in n-dimensional vector space 
formed with inequalities 
(including x > 0; j = 1,. . . ,n) , and a = (a1 , ... ,a ) is a j - n 
vector of "cost coefficients," which are expected to take 
values with some probability distribution P(* 16) under con- 
ditions of some given data 6. 
Sometimes one uses a criterion based on minimization of 
mean value Ef (a,x), XEX, and considers x0 as the optimal 
p o i n t  i f  
This  c r i t e r i o n  looks q u i t e  reasonable  i f  one i s  going t o  d e a l  
wi th  a b ig  number N of s i m i l a r  models, and t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  
f u n c t i o n  can be approximately descr ibed  (according t o  c e n t r a l  
l i m i t  theorem) a s  
where Q i s  a random (normal) v a r i a b l e  with mean ze ro  and 
2 
var i ance  a (x) = Df ( a , x ) .  But i f  you have t o  pu t  i n  a b i g  
investment  only  once, then  mean va lue  c r i t e r i o n  may not  work 
we l l ;  moreover, t h e  minimum po in t  x0 of mean va lue  func t ion  
E f ( a , x ) ,  xsX, can be t h e  maximum po in t  of t h e  c o s t  func t ion  
f ( a , x ) ,  xeX, with a g r e a t  p r o b a b i l i t y .  
I n  o rde r  t o  make t h i s  obvious remark c l e a r e r ,  l e t  u s  
mention a model of a non-symmetric co in  game with two outcomes: 
a = a  l , a2 ,  which t a k e s  p l ace  with corresponding p r o b a b i l i t e s  
p1,p2 = 1 - pl, and c o s t  func t ion  i s  f ( a , x )  with x = x1,x2. 
One has t o  pay f i j  = f ( u i , x  ) under t h e  outcome ai  i f  he j  
chooses i n  advance t h e  s t r a t e g y  x .  ( i , j  = 1 , 2 ) .  Suppose 
I 
f i j  = C ( i f j ) ,  where C i s  t h e  a l l  gambler c a p i t a l  ( s o  he w i l l  
l o s e  t h i s  c a p i t a l  C under t h e  s t r a t e g y  x .  i f  it be t h e  out -  
I 
come a., i j j ) ,  and f i i  = -MiC (he  w i l l  i nc rease  t h e  i n i t i a l  
1 
c a p i t a l  C i n  Mi t i m e s ) .  The mean va lue  func t ion  i s  
Suppose the outcome al takes place with a great probability 
p1 (say p1 = 0.999) and M2 is so big that 
Using mean value criterion, we obtain x0 = x2 as the optimal 
point, but obviously this is a very foolish strategy, except 
in the case when one should very much like to lose his capi- 
tal (because it will be with the great probability 0.999). 
Another similar example: suppose the cost function is 
(say pl = 0.999, p2 = 0.001) where 0 5 x 5 1 and the cost co- 
efficients all,a21 are such that all > 0; a 11% + a21p2 < O. 
Using mean value criterion, we have to choose x0 = 1, 
though with the great probability pl (pl = 0.999) it will be 
the maximum point (see Fig. 1) of the actual cost function 
f(a,x), 0 5 x < 1. 
Concerning the mean value type criterion, we wish to 
say some other things. It is very easy to realize that one 
may prefer a random variable n1 = f(a,x ) in comparison to 1 
f (a,x) = 
a10 + allx with probability p1 
( "20 + "21X with probability p2 = 1 - pl 
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another random variable n2 = f Carx2) if for some cructal 
point y 
Of course, there may be a few, in some sense, crucial points 
y = Y~,...~Y~. Suppose it is possible to estimate "an 
importance" of these points with the corresponding values 
u(y), y = yl,...,yn in such a way that one prefers ql (as 
compared to n2) if 
The preference relation can be rewritten in the form 
where 
Because for any distribution function F (y) (F ( -w)  = 0, F (m) = 1) 
we have 
I ~ F ( Y )  dU (Y) = -  U(Y) dF(y) +U(-) 
the preference criterion can be represented in the form 
EU(S1) < EU(S2) , ( 4 )  
where E(*) is the corresponding mean value. 
One can  c o n s i d e r  ( 4 )  f o r  a r b i t r a r y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  t y p e  
f u n c t i o n  U ( y ) ,  < y  < a s  t h e  g e n e r a l  mean v a l u e  c r i t e r i o n .  
Obviously,  i f  t h e  cor responding  d e n s i t y  u ( y ) ,  -- < y  < - is 
p o s i t i v e ,  t h e n  U ( y ) ,  < y  < - i s  a  monotone i n c r e a s i n g  
f u n c t i o n .  B e s i d e s ,  i f  f o r  any yl 5 y2 on some i n t e r v a l  we 
c o n s i d e r  y  a s  "more i m p o r t a n t "  i n  comparison w i t h  y2 ,  more 
p r e c i s e l y  i f  
i . e .  t h e  d e n s i t y  u ( y ) ,  XEI i s  a  monotone d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  
on t h e  i n t e r v a l  I ,  t h e n  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  U ( y )  , ~ E I ,  
i s  convex ( s e e  F i g .  2 )  . 
We a r e  go ing  t o  s u g g e s t  below a  few o t h e r  t y p e s  of  
c r i t e r i a  of  o p t i m i z a t i o n  f o r  random c o s t  f u n c t i o n s .  
1. L e t  f  ( a , x ) ,  X E X  be a  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  which depends 
on a  random parameter  a .  Suppose f o r  some a c c e p t a b l e  c o s t  
v a l u e  C we can n e g l e c t  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  c o s t  
w i l l  exceed C .  Suppose t h a t  minimal (random) c o s t  
C (a) = min f  ( a , x )  
xeX 
h a s  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h  a  r a t h e r  s m a l l  r ange  and 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  minimum p o i n t  S E X :  
f  ( a , [ )  = min f  ( a , x )  
X E  X 
h a s  a  d i s c r e t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  (maybe w i t h  a  v e r y  b i g  d i s p e r s i o n ) .  
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I t  seems q u i t e  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  t a k e  a  r i s k  t o  choose  such 
p o i n t  XOEX f o r  which 
P I £  (a,x") = ~ ( a )  1 = max p ( f ( a , x )  = C ( a )  1 . ( 5 )  
XEX 
Note t h a t  i f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n  ( 5 )  e q u a l s  t o  
1, i n  o t h e r  words,  t h e r e  is a  p o i n t  XOEX f o r  which 
f (a ,xo)  = min f  ( a , x )  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  1 , 
X E X  
t h e n  o u r  c r i t e r i p n  g i v e s  t h e  u s u a l  minimum of c o s t  f u n c t i o n .  
L e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  t h e  l i n e a r  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  
of  x = ( x l 1 . . . , x n ) ~ X ,  where a  = ( a l , . . . , a n )  i s  t h e  random 
v e c t o r  w i t h  a  g i v e n  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  P, and X i s  a 
s implex  i n  n-dimensional  v e c t o r  space  of t h e  t y p e  ( 2 ) :  
Denote x l , . .  . ,xN extreme p o i n t s  of  sLmplex X. As w e l l  
known, a  minimum p o i n t  S E X  (5 depends on a )  can  b e  chosen 
1 N 1 
among x  , . . . , x  , s o  x0 = x  , . . . ,xN is t h e  o p t i m a l  p o i n t  i n  
t h e  s e n s e  of  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  ( 5 )  i f  
k  P I C  = xO1 = max P I S  = x  1 
. 
l<k'N 
Thus, the problem is to find all probabilities* 
and to choose the optimal x0 as the point among xk; k = 1,. . . ,N, 
with the greatest probability Pk; k = 1,. ..,N. 
k We have Pk = P(Y ) where yk is the set of all vectors 
y = (y lI...,yn) for which the corresponding linear function 
has xk as the minimum point: 
k f(y,x ) = min f(y,x) . 
XEX 
In order to make our elementary consideration more clear, let 
us shift xk to the origin point x = 0. Obviously, the extreme 
point xk = 0 gives a minimum of f (y,x), XEX, iff 
n 1 yjxj 2 0 for all xsX , 
1 
(in other words, iff the vector y = (yl,...,yn) belongs to so- 
called polar cone) . 
Let us take all hyperplains 
k * Note the events {C = x 1; k = l,...,N generally are not 
N 
disjoined and 1 pk not necessary equals to 1. 
1 
k 
--see (2)--containing the extreme point x . (In the case 
xk = 0 we have bi = 0, kIk.) Let us introduce a cone 
The corresponding polar cone is exactly the set yk of all 
n 
0 
vectors y = (yl,.. . ,yn) such that 1 y .x 2 0, xexk (see Fig. 3 ) .  
1 1  
This polar cone yk is formed by all linear combinations 
0 
of the vectors ai = (a il,...,a ) ,  ieIk because a dual in 
polar cone for the set of all vectors (8) coincides with xk: 
obviously, 
k for all h i  2 0, iff xex . (See, for example, duality theorem 
in [l] . ) Thus, is the set of all vectors 
where ai = (ail,...,ain) are all vectors such that for x = x k 
at the relations (2) we have strict equalities, and the 
k 
optimal point can be found among x , k = 1, ..., N as a point 
with maximum probability 
- ( I ,  = 1 , 2  
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~ 
2. Suppose, as above, there is the acceptable cost, 
which can be exceeded only with a corresponding small 
probability, but the situation is different in the sense that 
the range of the minimum cost distribution is considerably 
big. (For example, the minimum point 6 = x1,x2 can be distri- 
buted with almost equal probabilities P1 > P2, but correspond- 
1 2 ing cost values are such that f (a,x ) > >  f (a,x ) , so there is 
no reason to choose the point x1 with the greatest probability 
P1 as optimum.) 
Suppose that one is going to risk in order to make the 
cost value less than some level Co. (Probability P {C(a) 5 Co} 
has to be considerably big.) Then one can choose optimal 
point XOEX in the sense that 
0 P Cf (u,xn) 5 Co 1 = max P If (a,x) 5 Co} . (11) 
xcx 
This criterion is of mean value type ( 4 )  concerning a new cost 
function EU(f (a,x)), XEX where 
namely, 
~u(f(u,xO)) = min EU(f(u,X)) . 
XEX 
(Note it is impossilbe to restrict "y" in order to deal with 
the convex function U(y), ~ € 1 . )  
c 0 
F I G U R E  L 
3. Suppose, now, t h e r e  is  a  good d e a l  ~f r i s k  t o  pay a  
b ig  amount i f  we use  "extreme s t r a t e g y n  x0 of types  ( 5 )  o r  
( l l ) ,  because with cons iderably  b i g  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  c o s t  va lue  
f  ( a ,  xo) may be too  much. Suppose one should l i k e  t o  prevent  
a  danger of dea l ing  wi th  t h e  "almost worst"  outcome a ,  and 
t h e  problem is t o  f i n d  optimal  s t r a t e g y  a g a i n s t  "very c l e v e r  
random enemy." I n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  fol lowing c r i t e r i o n  
I 
seems q u i t e  reasonable ( s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  minimax p r i n c i p a l  of 
game theo ry ) .  
Namely, suppose one ag rees  (roughly speaking) t o  r i s k  
only  wi th  a  small  p r o b a b i l i t y  E > 0. Let C(x) be t h e  "E-quan t i ln  
f o r  t h e  random v a r i a b l e  f ( a , x ) :  
C(x) = min C I  P{f (a ,x )  5 C }  5 1- E . 
One c a n  choose t h e  p o i n t  X O E X ,  which is o p t i m a l  i n  t h e  s e n s e  
t h a t  
0 C(x ) = min C ( x )  . 
X E  X 
I n  t h e  c a s e  of E = 0 ,  o u r  c r i t e r i o n  of  o p t i m a l i t y  c o i n c i d e s  
w i t h  w e l l  known minimax p r i n c i p a l  of t h e  game t h e o r y ,  which 
was mentioned above,  because  i f  E = 0 ,  t h e n  
C ( x )  = sup f  ( a , x ) '  . 
a  
(We mean s o - c a l l e d  e s s e n t i a l  s u p  f  ( a  , x )  concern ing  t h e  proba-  
b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  P of t h e  random v a r i a b l e  a . )  
For  t h e  l i n e a r  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  (1) w i t h  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  
a  = ( a l ,  ..., a  ) which a r e  weakly dependen t ,  one can  e x p e c t  
n  
n  
t h e  random v a r i a b l e  f ( a , x )  = I a  x  is  normal ly  d i s t r i b u t e d  
, j j  
(due t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  l i m i t  theorem) w i t h  a  mean v a l u e  
and v a r i a n c e  
( c i  = Eai; a .  . = E  ( a .  -c . )  ( a  -c j )  ; i ,  j  = 1,. . . , n )  . 13 1 3 1  
I f  it h o l d s  t r u e ,  t h e n  
where yE denotes E-quantil f or  the standard normal d i s t r ibut ion:  
This function 
(where af means the  square .root  of  the  p o s i t i v e  matrix 
{a. . 1 )  for  yE > 0 is  concave because 
1 3  
and the minimum point x0 can be found with we l l  known concave 
programming methods. (See,  for  example, [l] . ) 
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